China-Serbia Partnership Discourse in Serbia's Multi-Vector Foreign Policy

Abstract

Serbia has deepened its relations with China while formally maintaining European Union membership as its principal foreign-policy objective. This article examines how that apparently contradictory position is constructed and used. Drawing on Chinese and Serbian policy documents, European Commission reports, trade statistics, and the cases of railway construction, industrial investment, and the China-Serbia Free Trade Agreement, it connects partnership discourse with Serbia's role claims and foreign-policy practice. It argues that expressions such as “ironclad friendship,” “comprehensive strategic partnership,” and “community with a shared future” do more than celebrate bilateral goodwill. They provide continuity and political legitimacy for cooperation and help Serbian leaders present the country as a development-oriented, autonomous, and regionally connected actor. Yet this agency remains bounded. The European Union continues to be Serbia's principal market, investor, regulatory reference, and accession framework. China-Serbia cooperation therefore does not replace a European regional order. It gives Belgrade additional partners and bargaining resources within that order, while creating new trade, regulatory, environmental, and political tensions. The case demonstrates that changes in the Western Balkans cannot be understood solely as competition among external powers; they also depend on how local governments interpret and deploy external relationships.